UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-16-2021

State of Idaho v. Jessie Don Adams Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48023

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"State of Idaho v. Jessie Don Adams Appellant's Brief Dckt. 48023" (2021). Not Reported. 6899.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/6899

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
2/16/2021 11:46 AM
Idaho Supreme Court
Melanie Gagnepain, Clerk of the Court
By: Murriah Clifton, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
NO. 48023-2020
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-17-9547
v.
)
)
JESSE DON ADAMS,
)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)
________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF ADA
________________________
HONORABLE MICHAEL REARDON
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6661
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ........................................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ..................................................................................................... 2
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ............................................................................................ 7
ARGUMENT .............................................................................................................................. 8
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Adams
To Pay $15,053.49 In Restitution Stemming From His Conviction
For Petit Theft
................................................................................................................. 8
A. Introduction

................................................................................................................. 8

B. A Trial Court Abuses Its Discretion If It Orders Restitution
Not Authorized By Statute ............................................................................................... 8
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Adams
To Pay More Than $999.99 In Restitution For His Use Of
The Debit Card ................................................................................................................ 9
D. The District Court’s Reliance Upon State v. Richmond Was
Misplaced, Because Richmond Was Wrongly Decided
And Is Not Controlling .................................................................................................. 11
E. The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Adams To
Pay $15,053.49 In Restitution Stemming From His Conviction
For Petit Theft ............................................................................................................... 13
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .................................................................................................. 14

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990) ........................................................................... 13
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856 (2018)........................................................................9
State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868 (Ct. App. 1991) ......................................................................... 13
State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103 (Ct. App. 1991) ........................................................................ 11
State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599 (2011)............................................................................... 8, 9, 12
State v. Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659 (Ct. App. 1995)......................................................................... 13
State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 2012) ................................................................. 9, 10
State v. Richmond, 137 Idaho 35 (Ct. App. 2002) ...............................................................passim
State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360 (2003) .................................................................................... 12
State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 (2013)..........................................................................................8
Verska v. State Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889 (2011) .............................. 12
Viking Constr., Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187 (2010) ........................................ 12

Statutes
I.C. § 18-2407 ..................................................................................................................... 10, 11
I.C. § 18-7001 ..................................................................................................................... 10, 11
I.C. § 19-5304 ....................................................................................................................passim

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jesse Adams was the co-owner of Idaho Interior Services, LLC (hereinafter I.I.S.), a
painting company located in the Boise area. The State charged Mr. Adams with two counts of
grand theft, naming I.I.S. as the victim. In Count I, the State alleged Mr. Adams stole cash from
I.I.S. by cashing checks written to I.I.S., and taking the money for himself. In Count II, the State
alleged Mr. Adams stole credit, services, and merchandise from I.I.S., by making unauthorized
charges on a company debit card. At his trial, Mr. Adams did not dispute that he used the debit
card to charge business-related expenses, but he asserted that as a co-owner of I.I.S., he did not
need anyone’s permission to do so. The jury found Mr. Adams guilty of grand theft as alleged in
Count I, but found him not guilty of grand theft as alleged in Count II, and instead found him
guilt of the lesser included offense of petit theft.
Relying upon the same evidence it presented to the jury, the State sought $15,053.49 in
restitution related to Mr. Adams’ use of the company credit card. Mr. Adams objected to the
State’s request for any amount over $999.99, based upon the fact that the jury acquitted him of
grand theft, and found him guilty only of petit theft. The district court overruled Mr. Adams’
objection and ordered him to pay the full amount sought by the State related to that charge.
Mr. Adams asserts the district court abused its discretion by acting outside the bounds of
its lawful authority, by ordering Mr. Adams to pay the full amount of restitution sought by the
State related to Count II, because the district court had no lawful authority to order restitution in
an amount of $1,000.00 or greater for that charge, pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Jessie Adams with two counts of grand theft: Count I alleged that
Mr. Adams “did wrongfully take or obtain cash or funds” from I.I.S, in excess of $1,000.00, over
a two-year period; Count II alleged that Mr. Adams “did wrongfully take or obtain credit,
merchandise or services” from I.I.S., in excess of $1,000.00, over roughly that same period.
(R., pp.110-11; Tr., p.18, L.1 – p.19, L.5.)1 During Mr. Adams’ trial, Andy Lyon testified that
he and his wife started I.I.S., a painting and refinishing business, in 2007. (Tr., p.159, L.14 –
p.160, L.17.)2 Towards the end of 2014, Mr. Lyon and his family decided to move to Florida,
and he and his wife sold a 10% interest in I.I.S. to their former employee, Mr. Adams, for
$4,000.00; the agreement contemplated that a non-owner third party would act as bookkeeper,
while Mr. Adams would run I.I.S. and use profits from the business to pay the Lyons the
remaining $36,000 to complete the sale. (Tr., p.162, L.20 – p.167, L.9.) Mr. Adams started
running I.I.S. in January of 2015, although Mr. Lyon continued to field sales calls throughout
much of 2015. (Tr., p.167, L.10 – p.168, L.7.)
According to Mr. Lyon, all payments to I.I.S. were to be sent to the bookkeeper, but
Mr. Adams would endorse the payroll checks and would use a debit card to make businessrelated purchases.

(Tr., p.175, L.10 – p.177, L.20; p.179, L.4 – p.180, L.25.) Mr. Lyon

identified multiple checks, totaling $10,185.54 written to I.I.S. that were not deposited into

1

The Amended Information alleged that Mr. Adams committed Count I “on or about the 1st day
of January, 2015 and the 31st day of December, 2016,” while Count II alleged the crime occurred
“on or about the 1st day of January, 2015 and the 3rd day of November, 2016.” (R., pp.110-11.)
The district court granted the State’s oral motion to amend the information to allege the crimes
occurred “on or between” those specific dates. (Tr., p.18, L.1 – p.19, L.5.) The Amended
Information found in the Clerk’s Record does not reflect this change.
2
After page 81, line 22, the transcript omits line numbers. Citations to the line numbers in this
brief are estimates based upon the standard, 25-line protocol used in the first 81 pages of the
transcript.
2

I.I.S.’s accounts.

(Tr., p.182, L.2 – p.190, L.22.)

Mr. Lyon also testified to a series of

transactions made using Mr. Adams’ debit card that Mr. Lyon believed were not business-related
expenses, including payments for Mr. Adams’ cell phone bill, rental cars, payments made to
businesses located both within Idaho and out of State, and a particularly odd debit purchase of
$26.49 at the Silverwood Theme Park in Athol, Idaho. (Tr., p.190, L.23 – p.212, L.4.) Since
I.I.S. was only licensed in Idaho, Mr. Lyon testified that any purchases made out of state would
be unauthorized. (Tr., p.194, Ls.10-21.)
Mr. Lyon testified that Mr. Adams’ 10% ownership in the company did not allow him to
make what he believed were unauthorized purchases, “because the agreement was set forth with
[the accountant] – that’s why she was the intermediary and receipts needed to be provided for
expenditures so that they could be justified.” (Tr., p.198, L.19 – p.199, L. 9.) Mr. Lyon testified
that he and his wife did not sign a contract with Mr. Adams “because it was going to be an
ongoing thing,” and that although he believed there was something signed about the “terms of
this change-over,” neither he nor the accountant had a copy of any written agreement between
the Lyons and Mr. Adams. (Tr., p.217, L.16 – p.218, L.15.) Mr. Lyon also testified that there
was no written agreement about how the money would be handled: “that was just through the
accountant and making the affiliate account and giving the debit card usage with regard to what
could or couldn’t be spent and the verification through the bookkeeper’s office.” (Tr., p.220,
Ls.8-16.)
Mr. Adams testified that he never signed any kind of partnership agreement with
Mr. Lyon, and that he took over running all aspects of I.I.S. when the Lyons moved to Florida.
(Tr., p.433, L.6 – p.435, L.22.) According to Mr. Adams, the agreement contemplated that he
would use the profits to pay the remainder of the purchase price, and Mr. Lyon would continue
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to draw a salary until the transaction was complete. (Tr., p.435, Ls.17-22.) There was no written
agreement or policy handbook describing the co-owners’ rights and responsibilities in running
I.I.S. (Tr., p.435, L.23 – p.436, L.6.) Mr. Adams testified that, as a co-owner, he had full access
to the company’s bank account and did not need anyone’s approval or authorization to make
expense purchases. (Tr., p.436, Ls.7-22.)
Mr. Adams testified that things went south when clients failed to pay their bills and I.I.S.
was late on paying their own obligations; Mr. Adams insisted that the funds I.I.S. did have
should go to the employees first, while Mr. Lyon insisted that business expenses were taken care
of first. (Tr., p.437, L.25 – p.439, L.6.) Mr. Adams admitted to cashing the checks in question,
but testified that he used the money to pay employees, or that the money was for side-jobs that
either he or an employee completed, a gratuity paid by a client for he and his employees, and as
repayment for a lift boom rental that Mr. Adams paid for personally, which I.I.S. shared with
another company. (Tr., p.439, L.8 – p.444, L.9.)
As for the debit card transactions, Mr. Adams testified that all but one were for business
related purposes: I.I.S. paid his cell phone bill just as it paid the Lyons’ cell phone bills; the
rental cars were necessary because the company car broke down; the out-of-state purchases were
related to jobs I.I.S. did out of state; and other purchases were for birthday gifts for employees.
(Tr., p.444, L.10 – p.458, L.4.)

The only charge Mr. Adams did not recognize was the

transaction at the Silverwood Theme Park; he stated that he had never been there. (Tr., p.444,
Ls.15-21.)
The jury found Mr. Adams guilty of grand theft in Count I, the charge related to the
checks he cashed, but found him not guilty of grand theft in Count II, the charge related to his
use of the company debit card, and instead found him guilty of the lesser-included offense of
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petit theft. (R., pp.272-73.) On the felony count, the district court sentenced Mr. Adams to a
suspended unified term of seven years, with two years fixed, and placed him on probation for a
period of 14 years, and sentenced him to 90 days in jail on the misdemeanor count. (R., pp.295302.)
The State sought a total of $40,789.32 in restitution, including $15,053.493 for the
purchases made using the I.I.S. debit card, $14,450.29 in out-of-pocket expenses paid by
Mr. Lyon related his closing I.I.S. down, $10,185.54 for the stolen checks, and $1,100.00 for
Mr. Lyon’s lost wages. (R., pp.318-30.) Mr. Adams objected to the State’s restitution request
related to the use of the debit card, arguing that the jury’s verdict finding him not guilty of grand
theft, but guilty of petit theft, precluded the court from ordering restitution in an amount greater
that $999.99 related to that charge. (R., pp.331-33.) He argued that State v. Richmond, 137
Idaho 35 (Ct. App. 2002), a case in which the Court of Appeals held the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it ordered over $14,000 is restitution after a jury acquitted the
defendant of felony malicious injury to property, but found him guilty of misdemeanor malicious
injury to property, did not control the court’s decision in Mr. Adams’ case. (Id.)
The State argued that Richmond controlled, and that the district court could order the full
amount requested, despite the fact that the jury found Mr. Adams not guilty of grand theft,
because the court could order restitution for the actual amount of economic loss suffered by
Mr. Adams’ criminal conduct. (R., pp.319-26.) The district court agreed with the State, finding
3

In its initial motion for restitution, the State calculated the amounts charged to I.I.S.’s bank
account as totaling $14,038.92. (R., pp.306-11.) In its memorandum in support, the State first
claimed asserted that Mr. Adams’ use of the debit card totaled $10,149.92, but then later asserted
the amount totaled $15,053.49. (R., pp.318-26. It is not clear why the State provided three
different totals for the restitution it requested related to the petit theft convict, but in any event,
Mr. Adams did not dispute the accuracy of the State’s ultimate $15,053.49 request, and instead
argued that the district court did not have the legal authority to order restitution in any amount
greater than $999.99 stemming from the petit theft conviction. (Tr. p.583, L.13 – p.584, L.8.)
5

that it had the power to order Mr. Adams to pay $15,053.49 in restitution related to the use of the
debit card, despite the jury’s verdict finding Mr. Adams not guilty of grand theft related to those
charges. (R., pp.338-39.) Relying largely upon Richmond, the district court held the following:
[T]he Court in its discretion may determine the amount of restitution to be
awarded based on a preponderance of the evidence. That amount is not limited by
the monetary limits of the crime charge, but shall be limited up to the amount of
economic loss suffered by the victim. As Defendant has not presented evidence
or argument to dispute any speciﬁc amount charged to the Business Bank
Account, the Court, having presided over the trial and having reviewed the record,
the arguments of the parties, and the testimony given during the restitution
hearing, ﬁnds that the State has met its burden to show that the victim in this case
has suffered an economic loss in the requested amount of $15,053.49.
(Id.) The district court entered an order requiring Mr. Adams to pay I.I.S. a total of $25,239.03
in restitution, including $15,053.49 for Mr. Adams’ use of the I.I.S. debit card.4 (R., pp.342-44.)
Mr. Adams filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court’s order of restitution.
(R., pp.345-47.)

4

The court also noted that the State withdrew its request for Mr. Lyon’s lost wages, the court
rejected the State’s request for Mr. Lyon’s out-of-pocket expenses related to closing down I.I.S.,
and Mr. Adams did not contest the State’s request for restitution stemming from the stolen
checks. (R., pp.336-44.) Mr. Adams does not contest these rulings in this appeal.
6

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion by ordering Mr. Adams to pay Idaho Interior Services
$15,053.49 in restitution stemming from his conviction for petit theft?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Adams To Pay $15,053.49 In
Restitution Stemming From His Conviction For Petit Theft
A.

Introduction
Mr. Adams asserts that the district court acted outside the bounds of its legal authority

when it ordered Mr. Adams to pay $15,053.39 in restitution, stemming from his conviction for
petit theft. Idaho Code § 19-5304 only authorizes a court to order restitution for a crime for
which a defendant was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, absent a defendant’s agreement
to pay more. Since the jury found Mr. Adams not guilty of grand theft related to his use of the
company debit card, and instead found him guilty of petit theft, the district court had no authority
to order restitution in an amount greater than $999.99 related to that charge. By acting outside
the bounds of its legal authority, the district court abused its discretion, and this court should
vacate the restitution order and remand the case for further proceedings.

B.

A Trial Court Abuses Its Discretion If It Orders Restitution Not Authorized By Statute
A trial court’s authority to order restitution is statutory, and a court has no power to order

restitution not authorized by the legislature. See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 (2013); State v.
Richmond, 137 Idaho 35, 37 (Ct. App. 2002).

“The decision regarding whether to order

restitution, and in what amount, is within the district court's discretion and is guided by
consideration of the factors set forth in Idaho Code section 19–5304(7).” State v. Corbus, 150
Idaho 599, 602 (2011) (citing Richmond, 137 Idaho at 37).

In reviewing a trial court’s

discretionary decision, Idaho appellate courts apply a four-part test, asking whether the trial
court:

“(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer

boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with the legal standards applicable to the

8

specific choices available to it; and (4) reached its decision by the exercise of
reason.” Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 867 (2018).
Absent consent from the defendant,5 the district court’s power to order restitution is
limited by the crime for which the defendant was convicted. Idaho Code § 19-5304(7) reads, in
relevant part, “The court, in determining whether to order restitution and the amount of such
restitution, shall consider the amount of economic loss sustained by the victim as a result of the
offense . . . .” I.C. § 19-5304(7) (emphasis added). As recognized by the Supreme Court in
Corbus, “in order for restitution to be appropriate, there must be a causal connection between the
conduct for which the defendant is convicted and the injuries suffered by the victim.” 150 Idaho
at 602 (emphasis added). Section 19-5304(1)(b) states, “‘Found guilty of any crime’ shall mean
a finding by a court that a defendant has committed a criminal act and shall include an entry of a
plea of guilty, an order withholding judgment, suspending sentence, or entry of judgment of
conviction for a misdemeanor or felony.” Thus, the district court’s authority to order Mr. Adams
to pay restitution was limited to the crimes Mr. Adams was convicted of, not the crimes he was
charged with committing.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Adams To Pay More Than
$999.99 In Restitution For His Use Of The Debit Card
The district court’s power to order Mr. Adams to pay restitution as it relates to his use of

his I.I.S. debit card, was limited by the jury’s verdict finding Mr. Adams not guilty of grand
theft. Mr. Adams does not dispute that he put $15,053.49 on his I.I.S. debit card. (Tr., p.190,
L.23 – p.212, L.4.) He told the jury he used the card to make purchases exceeding $1,000.00,
explaining that as the co-owner of the business, he did not need anyone’s authorization before
5

A defendant may agree to pay restitution for uncharged conduct or for charges dismissed
through a plea bargain. State v. Nienburg, 153 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 2012).
9

doing so. (Tr., p.436, Ls.7-22; 444, L.10 – p.458, L.4.) While it impossible to discern exactly
how the jurors reached their decision, 6 the jury clearly found that Mr. Adams did not steal more
than $1,000.00, which is the distinction between grand theft and petit theft under I.C. § 18-2407.
(R., pp.260-62 (jury instructions related to Count II); p.273 (verdict for Count II).) Stated
another way, the jury unambiguously rejected the State’s claim that Mr. Adams’ theft resulted in
$15,053.49 of economic loss to I.I.S. (Id.) By ordering Mr. Adams to pay over $999.99 in
restitution for use of the debit card, the district court abused its discretion by acting outside the
bounds of its lawful authority.
To be clear, Mr. Adams does not argue that a district court may never order a defendant
convicted of petit theft to pay more than $999.99 is restitution. It is certainly conceivable, for
example, that in addition to losing the amount stolen, restitution may be ordered to the victim of
petit theft for wages lost due to attending court hearings, or a defendant may agree to pay
additional restitution as part of a plea agreement. I.C. §§ 19-5304(1)(a), (9); State v. Nienburg,
153 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 2012). But in this case, it is undisputed that the $15,053.49 in
restitution ordered by the court reflects the total amount of the charges Mr. Adams put on the
debit card. The State argued to the jury that Mr. Adams was guilty of grand theft for those
actions, but the jury rejected the State’s claim, finding Mr. Adams guilty of the lesser-included
petit theft offense. Thus, the district court’s statutory authority to order Mr. Adams to pay the
amount of restitution requested by the State related to his use of debit card, was capped at
$999.99. The district court abused its discretion by ordering more than that amount.

6

One reasonable explanation is that the jury found Mr. Adams guilty of petit theft, based upon
the $26.49 charge at the Silverwood Theme Park, which was the only charge Mr. Adams could
not explain. (Tr., p.444, Ls.15-21.)
10

D.

The District Court’s Reliance Upon State v. Richmond Was Misplaced, Because
Richmond Was Wrongly Decided And Is Not Controlling
The district court erroneously relied upon the Court of Appeals’ holding in Richmond,

because that case was wrongly decided. (R., pp.338-39.) The Richmond defendant was charged
with felony malicious injury to property, but the jury only found him guilty of the lesser-included
misdemeanor offense. Richmond, 137 Idaho at 36-37. The Court of Appeals upheld the district
court’s order requiring the defendant in that case to pay in excess of $14,000 in restitution,
despite the fact that I.C. § 18-7001 sets a $1,000.00 threshold between felony and a misdemeanor
malicious injury to property, similar to the $1,000.00 threshold set by I.C. § 18-2407 for theft.
Id. at 37-39. Based upon Richmond, the court in Mr. Adams’ case reasoned that restitution “is
not limited by the monetary limits of the crime charge[d], but shall be limited up to the amount
of economic loss suffered by the victim.” (R., p.339.) The court’s reliance upon Richmond was
misplaced.
First, as the Richmond Court noted, the appellant in that case failed to provide any
evidence as to how the district court reached its restitution calculation, and “[i]n the absence of
an adequate record on appeal to support the appellant’s claims, [Idaho appellate courts] will not
presume error.” Id. at 38 (citing State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991). But more
importantly, the Richmond Court reached its conclusion based upon its perception of the
legislature’s intent, rather than the plain language contained in the restitution statute: “It is often
stated that the policy behind our restitution statute favors full compensation to crime victims who
suffer economic loss.” Id. The Court continued,
we are not persuaded that the legislature intended, when it enacted I.C. § 19-5304,
to create exceptions for those crimes that designate monetary amounts in their
defining elements, i.e., grand theft, pet[it] theft, and the two grades of malicious
injury to property. Rather, the statute clearly intends for full restitution to be
ordered on economic loss from one's criminal conduct or criminal act.

11

Id. at 39.
While the Richmond Court’s reliance upon its perception of the legislature’s intent may
have been a valid when the case was decided in 2002, that statutory interpretation reasoning has
since been roundly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court, which now recognizes “‘The asserted
purpose for enacting the legislation cannot modify its plain meaning.’” Verska v. State
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 892-93 (2011) (quoting Viking Constr.,
Inc. v. Hayden Lake Irr. Dist., 149 Idaho 187, 191-92 (2010)). “The interpretation of a statute
‘must begin with the literal words of the statute; those words must be given their plain, usual,
and ordinary meaning; and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not
ambiguous, this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.’” Id. at 893
(quoting State v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362 (2003).)
The Richmond Court noted the definitions of “economic loss” and “victim” found in
I.C. § 19-5304 refer to the defendant’s “criminal conduct,” 137 Idaho at 37, but it failed to
acknowledge that the legislature also defined “criminal conduct,” albeit not using that exact
language. Section 19-5304(1)(b) states, “‘Found guilty of any crime’ shall mean a finding by a
court that a defendant has committed a criminal act and shall include an entry of a plea of guilty,
an order withholding judgment, suspending sentence, or entry of judgment of conviction for a
misdemeanor or felony.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, absent an actual finding of guilt, either
through a plea or jury verdict, there can be no “criminal conduct” upon which the district court
can order restitution. As the Corbus Court recognized, “in order for restitution to be appropriate,
there must be a causal connection between the conduct for which the defendant is convicted and
the injuries suffered by the victim,” 150 Idaho at 602.
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State v. Aubert, 119 Idaho 868 (Ct. App. 1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v.
Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662 (Ct. App. 1995)), a case distinguished by the Richmond Court, 137
Idaho at 38, more accurately addresses the limits of the trial court’s authority to order restitution.
In Aubert, the Court of Appeals vacated a trial court’s order for restitution stemming from a theft
case where the district court ordered the defendant to pay restitution for additional uncharged
thefts. 119 Idaho at 869. The Aubert Court acknowledged the definition of “found guilty of any
crime” contained in I.C. § 19-5304, and held, “A reasonable reading of I.C. § 19–5304, coupled
with the reasoning expressed in Hughey [v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990)], shows that a
restitution order must be limited to the crime or counts to which a defendant pled guilty or on
which he was convicted.” 119 Idaho at 870. While not directly on point considering that
Mr. Adams had been charged with, but acquitted of, grand theft, the Auburt Court’s recognition
that restitution can only be ordered for crimes in which the defendant was convicted, is
consistent with the plain language found in I.C. § 19-5304, and the Richmond Court erred when
it failed to apply that standard. Thus, the district court’s reliance upon Richmond was misplaced.

E.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Mr. Adams To Pay $15,053.49 In
Restitution Stemming From His Conviction For Petit Theft
The district court ordered Mr. Adams to pay restitution for a crime the jury found he did

not commit. Idaho Code § 19-5304 does not authorize the court to do so. For the reasons stated
above, by ordering Mr. Adams to pay 15,053.49 in restitution for a crime Mr. Adams was
acquitted of, the district court abused its discretion by acting outside the bounds of its lawful
authority.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Adams respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s restitution
order, and remand the case to the district court with instructions that the court order no more
than $999.99 in restitution related to Mr. Adams’ conviction for petit theft for his use of the
I.I.S debit card.
DATED this 16th day of February, 2021.

/s/ Jason C. Pintler
JASON C. PINTLER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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